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Abstract— The multi-hop routing in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) offers little protection against identity deception through 
replaying routing information. An adversary can exploit this defect to launch various harmful or even devastating attacks 
against the routing protocols, including sinkhole attacks, wormhole attacks and Sybil attacks. The situation is further 
aggravated by mobile and harsh network conditions. Traditional cryptographic techniques or efforts at developing trust-aware 
routing protocols do not effectively address this severe problem. To secure the WSNs against adversaries misdirecting the 
multi-hop routing, that has been designed and implemented TARF, a robust trust-aware routing framework for dynamic 
WSNs. Without tight time synchronization or known geographic information, This project provides trustworthy, time efficient 
and energy-efficient route. Most importantly, TARF proves effective against those harmful attacks developed out of identity 
deception; the resilience of TARF is verified through extensive evaluation with both implementation and empirical experiments 
on large-scale WSNs under various scenarios including mobile and RF-shielding network conditions.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are ideal 
candidates for applications to report detected events of 
interest, such as military surveillance and forest fire 
monitoring. A WSN comprises battery-powered senor 
nodes with extremely limited processing capabilities. 
With a narrow radio communication range, a sensor node 
wirelessly sends messages to a base station via a multi-
hop path. However, the multi-hop routing of WSNs often 
becomes the target of malicious attacks. An attacker may 
tamper nodes physically, create traffic collision with 
seemingly valid transmission, drop or misdirect messages 
in routes, or jam the communication channel by creating 
radio interference. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT
As a harmful and easy-to-implement type of 
attack, a malicious node simply replays all the outgoing 
routing packets from a valid node to forge the latter node’s 
identity; the malicious node then uses this forged identity 
to participate in the network routing, thus disrupting the 
network traffic. Even if this malicious node cannot 
directly overhear the valid node’s wireless transmission, it 
can collude with other malicious nodes to receive those 
routing packets, which is known as a wormhole attack.
A node in a WSN relies solely on the packets 
received to know about the sender’s identity, replaying 
routing packets allows the malicious node to forge the 
identity of this valid node. After “stealing” that valid 
identity, this malicious node is able to misdirect the 
network traffic. It may drop packets received, forward 
packets to another node not supposed to be in the routing 
path, or form a transmission loop through which packets 
are passed among a few malicious nodes infinitely. 
Sinkhole attacks can be launched after stealing a 
valid identity, in which a malicious node may claim itself 
to be a base station through replaying all the packets from 
a real base station. Such a fake base station could lure 
more than half the traffic, creating a “black hole.” This 
same technique can be employed to conduct another 
strong form of attack Sybil attack: through replaying the 
routing information of multiple legitimate nodes, an 
attacker may present multiple identities to the network. A 
valid node, if compromised, can also launch all these 
attacks. 
Time synchronization service in WSN has to 
meet challenges which are substantially different from 
those in infrastructure based networks. For instance, as 
each sensor has a finite battery source and communication 
is expensive in terms of energy, an important issue of 
WSN is energy efficiency. In addition, WSN show a 
higher failure probability over the time than in traditional 
networks due to battery depletion or destruction of the 
sensors, and changes in the environment can dramatically 
affect radio propagation causing frequent network 
topology changes and network partitions. Moreover, at 
high densities WSN become much more likely to suffer 
communication failures due to contention for their shared 
communication medium. These elements lead to strong 
energy efficiency, self configuration and robustness
requirements. In the last few years several clock 
synchronization protocols for WSN have been proposed 
based on different approaches, such as the Reference 
Broadcast Synchronization (RBS) proposed by Elson et al. 
[10], or hierarchical approaches [13], or interval{based [8, 
9], or probabilistic approaches for energy efficiency [7]. 
However, despite their diversity, these proposals share a 
common viewpoint: they provide an accurate time 
estimate by means of periodic synchronization performed 
by each sensor node and based on messages exchanged 
with its neighbor nodes. Clearly, each clock adjustment is 
energy {consuming since it involves transmitting 
messages and listening, besides the computational cost.
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II DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Before elaborating the detailed design of TARF, 
it would like to clarify a few design considerations first, 
including certain assumptions in Section A and the goals 
in Section C.
A. ASSUMPTIONS
The target is secure routing for data collection 
tasks, which are one of the most fundamental functions of 
WSNs. In a data collection task, a sensor node sends its 
sampled data to a remote base station with the aid of other 
intermediate nodes, as shown in Figure 1.  Though there 
could be more than one base station, our routing approach 
is not affected by the number of base stations; to simplify 
our discussion, that there is only one base station. An 
adversary may forge the identity of any legal node through 
replaying that node’s outgoing routing packets and 
spoofing the acknowledgement packets, even remotely 
through a wormhole.
Additionally, to merely simplify the introduction 
of TARF to assume no data aggregation is involved.
Nonetheless, this approach can still be applied to 
clusterbased WSNs with static clusters, where data are 
aggregated by clusters before being relayed. Cluster-based 
WSNs allows for the great savings of energy and 
bandwidth through aggregating data from children nodes 
and performing routing and transmission for children 
nodes. In a cluster-based WSN, the cluster headers 
themselves form a sub-network; after certain data reach a 
cluster header, the aggregated data will be routed to a base 
station only through such a sub-network consisting of the 
cluster headers. Our framework can then be applied to this 
sub-network to achieve secure routing for cluster based 
WSNs. TARF may run on cluster headers only and the 
cluster headers communicate with their children nodes 
directly since a static cluster has known relationship 
between a cluster header and its children nodes, though 
any link-level security features may be further employed.
Finally, a data packet has at least the following 
fields: the sender id, the sender sequence number, the 
next-hop node id (the receiver in this onehop transmission), 
the source id (the node that initiates the data), and the 
source’s sequence number. It insists that the source node’s 
information should be included for the following reasons 
because that allows the base station to track whether a data 
packet is delivered. It would cause too much overhead to 
transmit all the onehop information to the base station. 
Also, it assumes the routing packet is sequenced.
B. AUTHENTICATION REQUIREMENTS
Though a specific application may determine whether data 
encryption is needed, TARF requires that the packets are 
properly authenticated, especially the broadcast packets 
from the base station. The broadcast from the base station 
is asymmetrically authenticated so as to guarantee that an 
adversary is not able to manipulate or forge a broadcast 
message from the base station at will. Importantly, with 
authenticated broadcast, even with the existence of 
attackers, TARF may use TrustManager (Section 3.4) and 
the received broadcast packets about delivery information 
to choose trustworthy path by circumventing compromised 
nodes. Without being able to physically capturing the base 
station, it is generally very difficult for the adversary to 
manipulate the base station broadcast packets which are 
asymmetrically authenticated. The asymmetric 
authentication of those broadcast packets from the base 
station is crucial to any successful secure routing protocol. 
It can be achieved through existing asymmetrically 
authenticated broadcast schemes that may require loose 
time synchronization. As an example, µTESLA achieves 
asymmetric authenticated broadcast through a symmetric 
cryptographic algorithm and a loose delay schedule to 
disclose the keys from a key chain. Other examples of 
asymmetric authenticated broadcast schemes requiring 
either loose or no time synchronization are found in.
Considering the great computation cost incurred 
by a strong asymmetric authentication scheme and the 
difficulty in key management, a regular packet other than 
a base station broadcast packet may only be moderately 
authenticated through existing symmetric schemes with a 
limited set of keys, such as the message authentication 
code provided by TinySec. It is possible that an adversary 
physically captures a non-base legal node and reveals its 
key for the symmetric authentication. With that key, the 
adversary can forge the identity of that non-base legal 
node and joins the network “legally”. However, when the 
adversary uses its fake identity to falsely attract a great 
amount of traffic, after receiving broadcast packets about 
delivery information, other legal nodes that directly or 
indirectly forwards packets through it will start to select a 
more trustworthy path through TrustManager.
C. GOALS
TARF mainly guards a WSN against the attacks 
misdirecting the multi-hop routing, especially those based 
on identity theft through replaying the routing information. 
This paper does not address the denial-of-service (DoS) 
attacks, where an attacker intends to damage the network 
by exhausting its resource. For instance, it does not 
address the DoS attack of congesting the network by 
replaying numerous packets or physically jamming the 
network. TARF aims to achieve the following desirable 
properties:
HIGH THROUGHPUT Throughput is defined as the ratio of 
the number of all data packets delivered to the base station 
to the number of all sampled data packets. In our 
evaluation, throughput at a moment is computed over the 
period from the beginning time (0) until that particular 
moment. Note that single-hop re-transmission may happen, 
and that duplicate packets are considered as one packet as 
far as throughput is concerned. Through put reflects how 
efficiently the network is collecting and delivering data. 
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Here  the high throughput as one of our most important 
goals.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY Data transmission accounts for a 
major portion of the energy consumption. It evaluates 
energy efficiency by the average energy cost to 
successfully deliver a unit-sized data packet from a source 
node to the base station. Note that link-level re-
transmission should be given enough attention when 
considering energy cost since each re-transmission causes 
a noticeable increase in energy consumption. If every node 
in a WSN consumes approximately the same energy to 
transmit a unit-sized data packet can use another metric 
hop-per-delivery to evaluate energy efficiency. Under that 
assumption, the energy consumption depends on the 
number of hops, i.e. the number of one-hop transmissions 
occurring. To evaluate how efficiently energy is used can 
measure the average hops that each delivery of a data 
packet takes, abbreviated as hop-per-delivery. 
SCALABILITY & ADAPTABILITY TARF should work well with 
WSNs of large magnitude under highly dynamic contexts. 
It will evaluate the scalability and adaptability of TARF 
through experiments with large-scale WSNs and under 
mobile and hash network conditions. Here it does not 
include other aspects such as latency, load balance, or 
fairness. Low latency, balanced network load, and good 
fairness requirements can be enforced in specific routing 
protocols incorporating TARF.
III MODULES DESCRIPTION
A. ROUTING THE NETWORK
In this module, the networks embedded on the physical 
fiber topology. However, assessing the performance 
reliability achieved independent logical links can share the 
same physical link, which can lead to correlated failures. 
Mainly, it focuses on assessing the reliability of energy 
level and trusted network.
B. TRANSFER FILE
In this module, Analysis the Shortest Path algorithm 
independently routes each logical link on a physical path 
with the minimum number of hops in trusted network 
basis. Hence, under the algorithm Shortest Path, each 
light- path greedily takes the most reliable route and 
transfers the file.
C. SINKHOLE AND WORMHOLE ATTACKS
Prevent the base station from obtaining complete and 
correct sensing data
Particularly severe for wireless sensor networks some 
secure or geographic based routing protocols resist to the 
sinkhole attacks in certain level many current routing 
protocols in sensor networks are susceptible to the 
sinkhole attack Set of sensor nodes
Continuously monitor their surroundings forward the 
sensing data to a sink node, or base station Many-to-one 
Communication vulnerable to the sinkhole attack, where 
an intruder attracts surrounding nodes with unfaithful 
routing information alters the data passing through it or 
performs selective forwarding.
D. ENERGY WATCHER & TRUST MANAGER
In this module Cluster-based WSNs allows for the great 
savings of energy and bandwidth through aggregating data 
from children nodes and performing routing and 
transmission for children nodes. In a cluster-based WSN, 
the cluster headers themselves form a sub-network, after 
certain data reach a cluster header, the aggregated data 
will be routed to a base station only through such a 
subnetwork consisting of the cluster headers.  Our 
framework can then be applied to this sub-network to 
achieve secure routing for cluster based WSNs. 
A node N’s TrustManager decides the trust level 
of each neighbor based on the following events: discovery 
of network loops, and broadcast from the base station 
about data delivery. For each neighbor b of N, TNb 
denotes the trust level of b in N’s neighborhood table. At 
the beginning, each neighbor is given a neutral trust level 
0.5. After any of those events occurs, the relevant 
neighbors’ trust levels are updated. Note that many 
existing routing protocols have their own mechanisms to 
detect routing loops and to react accordingly [31], [32], 
[28]. In that case, when integrating TARF into those 
protocols with antiloop mechanisms, TrustManager may 
solely depend on the broadcast from the base station to 
decide the trust level can adopted such a policy when 
implementing TARF later. If anti loop mechanisms are 
both enforced in the TARF component and the routing 
protocol that integrates TARF, then the resulting hybrid 
protocol may overly react toward the discovery of loops. 
Though sophisticated loop-discovery methods exist in the 
currently developed protocols, they often rely on the 
comparison of specific routing cost to reject routes likely 
leading to loops. To minimize the effort to integrate TARF 
and the existing protocol and to reduce the overhead, when 
an existing routing protocol does not provide any anti loop 
mechanism, it adopts the following mechanism to detect 
routing loops. 
E. A PROBABILISTIC CLOCK READING METHOD
This method consists of two procedures:
 setVariables (Ti; H( ti )) invoked at each clock 
synchronization ti, with Ti accurate estimate of ti 
computed by running a clock synchronization 
protocol,
 PCR(t) that returns an estimate of the current 
reference time.
Figure 2 illustrates setV ariable(), and Figure 3 function
PCR(t). The data structures used are the followings:
 An array y[0..2] of records with two fields: 
y[j].val
representing the observed value y i-j relative to the
time interval [t i-j , t i-j-1] for j = 0, 1, 2, and 
y[j].m = (t i-j –t i-j-1 / r) representing the times in 
which the sensor was unable to get its clock 
synchronized;
 An integer matrix M = M(3 x 4) of the 
coefficients of the linear system.
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Fig 2:
Fig 3:
F. ANALYSIS ON ENERGY WATCHER AND TRUST 
MANAGER
Now that a node N relies on its EnergyWatcher 
and TrustManager to select an optimal neighbor as its 
next-hop node, it would like to clarify a few important 
points on the
design of EnergyWatcher and TrustManager. First, the 
energy cost report is the only information that a node is to 
passively receive and take as “fact.” It appears that such 
acceptance of energy cost report could be a pitfall when an 
attacker or a compromised node forges false report of its 
energy cost. Note that the main interest of an attacker is to 
prevent data delivery rather than to trick a data packet into 
a less efficient route, considering the effort it takes to 
launch an attack. As far as an attack aiming at preventing 
data delivery is concerned, TARF well mitigates the effect 
of this pitfall through the operation of TrustManager. Note 
that the TrustManager on one node does not take any 
recommendation from the TrustManager on another node. 
If an attacker forges false energy report to form a false 
route, such intention will be defeated by TrustManager: 
when the TrustManager on one node finds out the many 
delivery failures from the broadcast messages of the base 
station, it degrades the trust level of its current next-hop 
node; when that trust level goes below certain threshold, it 
causes the node to switch to a more promising next-hop 
node.
Fig. 4. Each node selects a next-hop node based on its 
neighborhood table, and broadcast its energy cost within 
its neighborhood. To maintain this neighborhood table, 
Energy Watcher and TrustManager on the node keep track 
of related events (on the left) to record the energy cost and 
the trust level values of its neighbors.
IV IMPLEMENTATION
In order to evaluate TARF in a real-world setting, it 
implemented the TrustManager component on TinyOS 2.x, 
which can be integrated into the existing routing protocols 
for WSNs with the least effort. Originally, it had 
implemented TARF as a self-contained routing protocol 
on TinyOS 1.x before this second implementation. 
However, decided to re-design the implementation 
considering the following factors. First, the first 
implementation only supports TinyOS 1.x, which was 
replaced by TinyOS 2.x; the porting procedure from 
TinyOS 1.x to TinyOS 2.x tends to frustrate the 
developers.  Second, rather than developing a self-
contained routing protocol, the second implementation 
only provides a TrustMan ager component that can be 
easily incorporated into the existing protocols for routing 
decisions. The detection of routing loops and the 
corresponding reaction are excluded from the 
implementation of TrustManager since many existing 
protocols, such as Collection Tree Protocol and the link 
connectivity-based protocol, already provide that feature. 
As it worked on the first implementation, it noted that the 
existing protocols provide many nice features, such as the 
analysis of link quality, the loop detection and the routing 
decision mainly considering the communication cost. 
Instead of providing those features, our implementation 
focuses on the trust evaluation based on the base broadcast 
of the data delivery, and such trust information can be 
easily reused by other protocols. Finally, instead of using 
TinySec exclusively for encryption and authentication as 
in the first implementation on TinyOS 1.x, this re-
implementation let the developers decide which 
encryption or authentication techniques to employ; the 
encryption and authentication techniques of TARF may be 
different than that of the existing protocol.
A. TRUSTMANAGER IMPLEMENTATION 
The TrustManager component in TARF is 
wrapped into an independent TinyOS configuration named 
TrustManagerC. TrustManagerC uses a dedicated logic 
channel for communication and runs as a periodic service 
with a configurable period, thus not interfering with the 
application code. Though it is possible to implement 
TARF with a period always synchronized with the routing 
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protocol’s period that would cause much intrusion into the 
source code of the routing protocol. The current 
TrustManagerC uses a period of 30 seconds; for specific 
applications, by modifying a certain header file, the period 
length may be re-configured to reflect the sensing 
frequency, the energy efficiency and trustworthiness 
requirement. TrustManagerC provides two interfaces (see 
Figure 4), TrustControl and Record, which are 
implemented in other modules. The TrustControl interface 
provides the commands to enable and disable the trust 
evaluation, while the Record interface provides the 
commands for a root, i.e., a base station, to add delivered 
message record, for a non-root node to add forwarded 
message record, and for a node to retrieve the trust level of 
any neighboring node. The implementation on a root node 
differs from that on a non-root node: a root node stores the 
information of messages received (delivered) during the 
current period into a record table and broadcast delivery 
failure record; a non-root node stores the information of 
forwarded messages during the current period also in a 
record table and compute the trust of its neighbors based 
on that and the broadcast information. Noting that much 
implementation overhead for a root can always be 
transferred to a more powerful device connected to the 
root, it is reasonable to assume that the root would have 
great capability of processing and storage.
A root broadcasts two types of delivery failure 
record: at most three packets of significant undelivered 
intervals for individual origins and at most two packets of 
the id’s of the origins without any record in the current 
period. For each origin, at most three significant 
undelivered intervals are broadcast. For a non-root node, 
considering the processing and memory usage overhead, 
the record table keeps the forwarded message intervals for 
up to 20 source nodes, with up to 5 non-overlapped 
intervals for each individual origin. Our later experiments 
verify that such size limit of the table on a non-root node 
produces a resilient TARF with moderate overhead. The 
record table on a node keeps adding entries for new 
origins until it is full. With our current implementation, a 
valid trust value is an integer between 0 and 100, and any 
node is assigned an initial trust value of 50. The weigh 
parameters are: wupgrade = 0.1, wdegrade = 0.3. The trust 
table of a non-root node node keeps the trust level for up 
to 10 neighbors. Considering that an attacker may present 
multiple fake id’s, the implementation evicts entries with a 
trust level close to the initial trust of any node. Such 
eviction policy is to ensure that the trust table remembers 
those neighbors with high trust and low trust; any other 
neighbor not in this table is deemed to have the initial trust 
value of 50.
V INCORPORATION OF TARF INTO EXISTING 
PROTOCOLS
To demonstrate how this TARF implementation can be 
integrated into the exiting protocols with the least effort, it 
incorporated TARF into a collection tree routing protocol 
(CTP). The CTP protocol is efficient, robust, and reliable 
in a network with highly dynamic link topology. It 
quantifies link quality estimation in order to choose a 
next-hop node. The software platform is TinyOS 2.x. To 
perform the integration, after proper interface wiring, 
invoke the TrustControl.start command to enable the trust 
evaluation; call the Record.addForwarded command for a 
non-root node to add forwarded record once a data packet 
has been forwarded; call the Record.addDelivered 
command for a root to add delivered record once a data 
packet has been received by the root. Finally, inside the 
CTP’s task to update the routing path, call the 
Record.getTrust command to retrieve the trust level of 
each next-hop candidate; an algorithm taking trust into 
routing consideration is executed to decide the new next-
hop neighbor.
Similar to the original CTP’s implementation, the 
implementation of this new protocol decides the next-hop 
neighbor for a node with two steps (see Figure 5): Step 1 
traverses the neighborhood table for an optimal candidate 
for the next hop; Step 2 decides whether to switch from 
the current next-hop node to the optimal candidate found. 
For Step 1, as in the CTP implementation, a node would 
not consider those links congested, likely to cause a loop, 
or having a poor quality lower than a certain threshold. 
This new implementation prefers those candidates with 
higher trust levels; in certain circumstances, regardless of 
the link quality, the rules deems a neighbor with a much 
higher trust level to be a better candidate. The preference 
of highly trustable candidates is based on the following 
consideration: on the one hand, it creates the least chance 
for an adversary to misguide other nodes into a wrong 
routing path by forging the identity of an attractive node 
such as a root; on the other hand, forwarding data packets 
to a candidate with a low trust level would result in many 
unsuccessful link-level transmission attempts, thus leading 
to much re-transmission and a potential waste of energy. 
When the network throughput becomes low and a node 
has a list of low-trust neighbors, the node will exclusively 
use the trust as the criterion to evaluate those neighbors for 
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routing decisions. As show in Figure 5, it uses trust/cost as 
a criteria only when the candidate has a trust level above 
certain threshold. The reason is, the sole trust/cost criteria 
could be exploited by an adversary replaying the routing 
information from a base station and thus pretending to be 
an extremely attractive node. As for Step 2, compared to 
the CTP implementation, add two more circumstances 
when a node decides to switch to the optimal candidate 
found at Step 1: that candidate has a higher trust level, or 
the current next-hop neighbor has a too low trust level. 
This new implementation integrating TARF requires 
moderate program storage and memory usage. Here 
implemented a typical TinyOS data collection application, 
MultihopOscilloscope, based on this new protocol. The 
MultihopOscilloscope application, with certain modified 
sensing parameters for our later evaluation purpose, 
periodically makes sensing samples and sends out the 
sensed data to a root via multiple routing hops. Originally, 
MultihopOscilloscope uses CTP as its routing protocol. 
Now list the ROM size and RAM size requirement of both 
implementation of MultihopOscilloscope on non-root 
Telosb motes in Table 1. The enabling of TARF in 
MultihopOscilloscope increases the size of ROM by 
around 1.3KB and the size of memory by around 1.2KB.
VI RELATED WORK
It is generally hard to protect WSNs from wormhole 
attacks, sinkhole attacks and Sybil attacks based on 
identity deception. The countermeasures often requires 
either tight time synchronization or known geographic 
information. FBSR, as a feedback-based secure routing 
protocol for WSNs , uses a statistics-based detection on a 
base station to discover potentially compromised nodes. 
But the claim that FBSR is resilient against wormhole and 
Sybil attacks is never evaluated or examined; the Keyed-
OWHC-based authentication used by FBSR also causes 
considerable overhead. There also exists other work on 
trust-aware secure routing that is evaluated only through 
computer simulation, such as.
There are certain existing secure routing solutions 
for WSNs based on trust and reputation management; 
however, they rarely address the “identity theft” exploiting 
the replay of routing information. Two such representative 
solutions are ATSR and TARP. Neither ATSR nor TARP 
offers protection against the identity deception through 
replaying routing information. ATSR is a location-based 
trust-aware routing solution for largeWSNs. ATSR 
incorporates a distributed trust model utilizing direct and 
indirect trust, geographical information as well as 
authentication to protect the WSNs from packet 
misforwarding, packet manipulation and 
acknowledgements spoofing. Another trust-aware routing 
protocol for WSNs is TARP, which exploits nodes’ past 
routing behavior and link quality to determine efficient 
paths.
VII CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Designed and implemented TARF, a robust trust aware 
routing framework for WSNs, to secure multihop routing 
in dynamic WSNs against harmful attackers exploiting the 
replay of routing information. TARF focuses on 
trustworthiness and energy efficiency, which are vital to 
the survival of a WSN in a hostile environment. With the 
idea of trust management, TARF enables a node to keep 
track of the trustworthiness of its neighbors and thus to 
select a reliable route. This prospective has a noticeable 
impact on WSN for their strong energy efficiency, 
robustness and self configuration requirements.
Unlike previous efforts at secure routing for WSNs, TARF 
effectively protects WSNs from severe attacks through 
replaying routing information; it requires neither tight time 
synchronization nor known geographic information. The 
resilience and scalability of TARF are proved through 
both extensive simulation and empirical evaluation with 
large-scale WSNs; the evaluation involves static and 
mobile settings, hostile network conditions, as well as 
strong attacks such as wormhole attacks and Sybil attacks. 
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